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Structured Abstract 
 
Purpose 
 
The theoretical case for land value capture is well known but the effectiveness of affordable 
housing delivery as a capture mechanism is not so well documented. Building on the earlier 
theoretical and empirical work of Whitehead (1991 and 2007) and Crook and Whitehead 
(2002), this paper considers the provision of affordable housing from a land value capture 
viewpoint, focusing on the process by which the amount of affordable housing is determined 
between landowners/developers on the one hand and local planning authorities on the other. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
 
The paper adopts a mixed mode approach to data collection. Two surveys of local planning 
authorities were undertaken, together with a series of case study interviews. 
 
Findings 
 
The paper evaluates whether land value capture has been an effective mechanism for delivering 
affordable housing by focusing on three principal areas: first, the political agenda in relation to 
land value capture and the supply of affordable housing; second, the nature and motivation of 
the stakeholders involved in affordable housing decision-making; and third, the use of economic 
models as decision tools for determining the amount and type of affordable housing are 
negotiated. 
 
Originality/Value 
 
The research provides some insight into the effectiveness of local authority affordable housing 
targets as a means of capturing the uplift in land value that results from the grant of planning 
permission. 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Planning permission is required for development in England and the grant of permission 
usually results in an increase in land value.  England has a rather chequered history of 
legislation that attempted to capture, in the form of a tax, some (and at one time all) of this land 
value uplift; but by the early 1980s all were repealed.  Instead of direct taxation, negotiated 
planning agreements between local planning authorities and developers/landowners have 
evolved as the sole mechanism by which local government has attempted to capture an element 
of land value.  Under these planning agreements developers have been obliged to contribute, 
either financially or in kind, towards infrastructure provision, community investment and 
development mitigation.  Throughout the 1990s affordable housing became an increasingly 
important part of these contributions, to the extent that local authorities had developed 
sophisticated targets for the amount of affordable housing they sought from developers and 
central Government were offering grant assistance to the housing associations that were 
acquiring the completed dwellings. 
 
Then, in 2010, in an attempt to simplify and speed up the planning process, the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL) was introduced and, after a very slow start, has now been adopted by 
approximately one third of local authorities.  Originally intended as a replacement for 
negotiated planning agreements, CIL now sits alongside that mechanism so that developers pay 
CIL to help fund infrastructure provision, and negotiate the agreements to mitigate the impact 
of their development and to continue to provide an element of affordable housing in their 
residential schemes. 
 
The CIL charging rates and the amount of affordable housing that can be sought from 
developers is regulated by the use of financial viability assessments, which limit the amount of 
land value uplift that flows from the grant of planning permission to a ‘viable’ proportion. In 
practice this approach has proved difficult to administer for reasons that centre on the use of 
these viability assessments, including: 
 
 An absence of evidence on which to base valuations of a development site before and after 
the grant of planning permission; 
 Difficulties in agreeing how much of the land value uplift should be allocated to developer 
contributions under CIL and negotiated planning agreements; and 
 A lack consensus on how to produce viability assessments that can cope with the dynamics 
of real estate development. 
 
As a consequence, a great deal of controversy now surrounds the viability testing of these land 
value capture mechanisms. Some of the issues raised are reminiscent of earlier attempts to levy 
land tax; paucity of transaction evidence and consequent lack of agreement on values, and 
disagreement over the proportion of land value uplift that should be captured, are two 
examples.  But some of the problems are new: confidentiality of developer appraisals that are 
used to calculate the amount of land value capture; difficulty in deciding appropriate or 
‘competitive’ returns to developers and landowners.  On top of these procedural and political 
issues, there are growing concerns about the adequacy of the conventional method of valuing 
development land. Some of these concerns have been explored in the literature. Christophers 
(2013) examined the use of financial viability models for determining affordable housing from 
the perspective of performativity – the actualisation of the world of affordable housing 
development by the model itself. Crosby et al (2013) and Coleman et al (2013) focus on some of 
the more technical aspects of viability modelling, particularly input uncertainty and output 
sensitivity, whereas McAllister et al (2013 and 2015) question the use of industry-derived 
decision rules to determine viability and hence land value capture. 
 
This paper, therefore, evaluates whether land value capture has been an effective mechanism 
for delivering affordable housing by focusing on three principal areas: first, the political agenda 
in relation to land value capture and the supply of affordable housing; second, the nature and 
motivation of the stakeholders involved in affordable housing decision-making; and third, the 
use of economic models as decision tools for determining the amount and type of affordable 
housing are negotiated. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Policy context and affordable housing delivery 
 
Land use regulation limits the supply, and therefore increases the price, of land for regulated 
uses, including housing. Landowners thus receive an unearned increase in their wealth while, at 
the same time, the cost of housing becomes unaffordable for marginal buyers. In England, social 
housing used to be provided by local authorities and voluntary, often philanthropic, housing 
associations with the help of government loans and grants. Social housing is let at ‘social rents’ 
that are established using an ‘affordability’ formula based on local income levels rather than 
determined by local market rental levels. The housing was offered to households that found 
themselves economically excluded from market housing and eligibility is determined with 
regard to local incomes and local house prices. Then, in the 1980s, policies introduced by the 
Conservative Government removed the ability of local councils to use local taxes to fund social 
housing and central government grant funding was redirected to new housing associations. In 
addition, the existing stock of social housing was reduced through the mechanism of ‘right to 
buy’ that gave tenants council-owned dwellings the legal right to purchase their dwelling at a 
discounted price. Faced with these policies, and a central Government ideological commitment 
to home ownership rather than renting, many local authorities decided to transfer their social 
housing stock to existing and newly formed housing associations. 
 
From 2011, housing associations (now referred to as ‘private registered providers of social 
housing’) and local authorities could also offer ‘affordable rent’ housing to certain categories of 
occupier such as key workers at rents of up to 80% of the local market rent. The supply of these 
affordable rented dwellings dramatically increased at the expense of the supply of social rented 
dwellings (see Table 1). The table shows how the numbers of various types of new-build 
affordable dwellings has changed over the past 25 years. On average, new-builds make up 
around 90% of all additional affordable dwellings in any year, the remainder being acquisitions. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Affordable housing delivery through planning obligations 
 
Local authorities sought alternative ways of delivering housing to those who could not afford to 
buy or rent privately. A key tool was the use of ‘planning obligations’. This land value capture 
mechanism first appeared as ‘Section 52 agreements’ following enactment of the 1971 Town 
and Country Planning Act. Renamed ‘Section 106 agreements’ following enactment of the 1990 
Town and Country Planning Act, these agreements enable local planning authorities to enter 
into legal contracts with developers to regulate aspects of a development. In the early days this 
regulation took the form of site-specific mitigation measures and charges were levied according 
to formulae for each item but gradually these obligations began to include the provision of 
infrastructure, community facilities – including affordable housing – and environmental 
improvements. 
 
Policies that specifically encouraged the use of planning obligations to provide affordable 
housing began with the first ‘rural exceptions policy’ in 1979. This enabled local authorities to 
grant planning permission for dwellings on sites that would otherwise not be permitted, 
provided that only affordable homes are provided (Crook et al, 2002). A Government planning 
circular, Circular 1991/7 (DoE, 1991), and Planning Policy Guidance Note Number 3, PPG3 
(DoE, 1992 and DETR, 2000), provided more guidance on the use of planning obligations for 
affordable housing. Then Circular 6/98, stated that provision of affordable housing should be a 
material consideration when residential planning permission is agreed, leaving it up to local 
government to decide what affordable meant: “The policy should define what the authority 
regards as affordable, but this should include both low-cost market and subsidised housing, as both 
will have some role to play in providing for local needs” (DETR 1998, Paragraph 9a). All of this 
planning guidance was abolished by Conservative-led coalition Government in 2010 and 
current policy is now enshrined in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (DCLG, 
2012) but the premise for the supply of affordable housing via S106 planning obligations 
remains. 
 
The legally binding S106 agreements to provide affordable housing as a planning obligation 
may take the form of a cash payment or be provided ‘in kind’.  The former is referred to as a 
‘commuted sum’ and the latter is usually provided via a land contribution or provision of 
completed dwellings to a ‘registered provider’ of affordable housing at a discounted price. In 
kind provision is almost always preferable as it helps meet widely adopted policies that 
promote mixed community schemes. These S106 agreements “are in effect locally determined 
and negotiated betterment levies on development values, hypothecated for local needs” (Crook and 
Monk, 2011, p997). 
 
As well as social and affordable rent dwellings, intermediate housing is offered to at a cost that 
is below market levels, in both the rental and capital markets. Intermediate rent housing is 
offered to occupiers who do not qualify for social rented housing and nor can they afford 
affordable rents. For intermediate ownership housing, shared ownership and equity loans are 
offered to those unable to buy a dwelling outright. Housing associations (or private registered 
providers) have become the main providers of new affordable homes and they have become 
very dependent on planning obligations for land and funding (Crook and Monk, 2011). 
 
So planning obligations, contained within Section 106 agreements, are the current mechanisms 
employed by local authorities to capture part of the uplift in land value that is realised upon 
grant of planning consent. The provision of social housing for rent by local government has been 
replaced by a mechanism by which developers are required to provide affordable housing when 
private (market) dwellings are constructed. It is, essentially, a cross subsidy (Crook and 
Whitehead, 2002). The idea is that developers may reduce their land acquisition prices (thus 
making landowners pay) or absorb the cost as an additional development cost. The latter may 
affect the supply of housing but the effect may be countered by building more cheaply or more 
densely. 
 
At the same time, the type or tenure of affordable housing has changed from social housing to 
affordable rent to intermediate ownership or shared equity and, more recently, discount market 
housing (for example, starter homes offered at a 20% discount to first time buyers). This shift is 
tied in with a change in the types of households that might be entitled to it. This is because, as 
the cost of housing has risen substantially in many parts of England, more and more people are 
excluded from the market including not only unemployed and low-income households but also 
key workers and first-time buyers. The shift from social housing to discount market housing is 
also linked to a change in Government ideology away from renting and towards home 
ownership. 
 
According to Whitehead (2007) the use of S106 to provide affordable housing was adopted by 
over 90 per cent of local authorities. Table 2 shows the number of new-build dwellings funded 
by S106 contributions1. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Affordable housing, provided with the assistance of the planning system via planning 
obligations, has been with us in England in one way or another for at least 25 years. Recently, 
this local level land value capture mechanism has been joined by another – the Community 
Infrastructure Levy (CIL). CIL came into force in 2010 and provides local authorities in England 
and Wales with the opportunity to raise contributions from developers to fund infrastructure 
that is needed as a result of new development. CIL charging rates are based on the size and type 
of the new development. CIL is intended to operate alongside a scaled back system of section 
106 planning obligations, which will only be used for site-specific items and affordable housing. 
As with S106, CIL is a local levy and it is the responsibility of planning authorities in England 
and Wales to decide whether to introduce it. 
 
3. Research method 
 
Using two surveys of local authorities undertaken in 2013 and 2015 on behalf of the UK 
Government (DCLG, 2014 and 2017), this section describes the approach taken to identify some 
of the key lessons that can be learnt from policies to deliver affordable housing using a land 
value capture mechanism. 
 
The 2013 survey involved all local planning auhorities in England except the National Park 
Authorities and the London Thames Urban Development Corporation. At that time there were 
366 local planning authorities in England, broken down as follows: 
 
 District and borough councils (228)  
 Metropolitan borough councils (20)  
 London borough councils (32)  
 City councils (36)  
 County councils: two-tier (27) and unitary (8)  
 National parks (9)  
 Development corporations and partnerships, including the Olympic Delivery Authority (6) 
 The Greater London Authority 
 
The survey focused on the 326 unitary authorities because these are the primary negotiators of 
planning obligations via S106 agreements and most Government statistics refer to this 
grouping. The questionnaire was emailed to relevant personnel in local authority planning 
departments. It sought responses to questions relating to six areas of investigation: 
 
a) The number and proportion of planning permissions that include planning obligations  
b) The value of planning obligations agreed  
c) The value of planning obligations likely to be delivered  
d) The breakdown of planning obligations by value and category  
e) The value of affordable housing delivered through s106 agreements; and  
f) Policies and practices regarding re-negotiation of s106 agreements, affordable housing 
and the use of standard s106 agreements and charging formulae  
                                                        
1 When S106 funding is combined with other funding sources they are recorded under ‘partial grant’. 
These other funding sources have more or less ceased so numbers of partial grant units are likely to be 
very small. There is no way of knowing how partial a partial grant is. ‘Pure’ S106 delivery is recorded in 
the ‘nil grant’ field. Table 2 focuses on nil grant units. 
 
126 completed and usable questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 40%.  Using the 
classification of local authority ‘families’ adopted by Crook et al (2006) the breakdown of 
responses is shown in Table 3 alongside the breakdown of all local authorities. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
A possible problem with a questionnaire approach is that LPAs that are (relatively) more 
effective in securing planning obligations are more likely to hold appropriate data and respond 
to the survey. When extrapolating from the sample to produce a national picture, it is important 
to ensure that the sample is representative and includes authorities that span the urban-rural, 
regional and political spectrums and different rates and type of development activity. Therefore, 
the estimates for the number and value of planning obligations are based on a process of 
clustered extrapolation.  Survey responses were ‘grossed up’ to provide estimates for the whole 
population of local authorities. When extrapolating from the sample, it was important to ensure 
that the sample was appropriately weighted, representative and included local authorities that 
span the urban-rural, regional and political spectrums and different rates and type of 
development activity. 
 
To achieve this, local authorities were classified into seven clusters according to the 
characteristics of their residents and reflecting the urban/rural and socio-economic profile. 
Sample results were extrapolated by assuming that the average of the sample returns in a socio-
economic cluster represented all local authorities in that cluster. This average could then be 
multiplied by the total number of local authorities in that cluster to compute an estimate for the 
cluster population. Table 4 shows that the breakdown of survey returns was a good 
representation of the population breakdown of local authority families.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
The 2015 survey investigated the attitudes and experiences of local authorities that were 
implementing and operating CIL. The survey also investigated attitudes and experiences of 
those local authorities that have not yet adopted a CIL or that have decided not to implement a 
CIL. This sample of ‘non-adopters’ was a mixture of those making progress towards adoption 
and those that have not yet started. It was constructed so that it was comparable in terms of 
local authority family (see 2013 survey method) and median house price to the ‘adopters’ 
sample. Six house price groups were derived from DCLG Live Table 586, which publishes 
median house prices based on Land Registry data at the local authority level.  Table 5 shows the 
breakdown of the two samples. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
It is important to note that the breakdown of local authorities that have adopted CIL may be 
different from the breakdown of all local authorities.  In other words certain types of local 
authority may be more inclined to adopt CIL than others.  Comparing CIL adopters against a 
sample of non-adopters in the way described above addresses this issue. 
 
The questionnaire was structured in two parts; one for the local authorities that had adopted a 
CIL and the other for those that had not yet adopted a CIL. Survey questions for the local 
authorities that have adopted a CIL covered the following areas:  
 CIL administration  
 Operation of CIL 
 Scaled-back planning obligations  
 Comparison with situation pre CIL 
 Spending of CIL receipts  
 
Survey questions for local authorities that have yet to adopt a CIL or have elected not to do so 
were based around the following areas:  
 Current policies for planning obligations 
 Affordable housing targets and site size thresholds  
 Number and type of planning obligations agreed and delivered in 2013/14  
 Costs associated with negotiating and monitoring s106 planning obligations  
 Influences on the number and value of planning obligations agreed  
 Value of planning obligations agreed and monies received 
 CIL policy and progress  
 
The survey therefore involved a sample of 130 local planning authorities in England. 66 
completed questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 51%. Pearson’s chi-square test 
statistic reveals no statistically significant association between CIL adoption status and median 
house price group or between CIL adoption status and LA family so it can be concluded that the 
two samples are similar in both these respects.  Also, independent samples t-tests revealed no 
statistically significant difference between the two samples in terms of median house prices, 
housing starts and planning decisions. There did not appear to be a bias in responses when 
classified by house price group but perhaps some bias when categorised by local authority 
family towards ‘Commuter Belt’ local authorities. However, we do not think that had a 
significant impact on the results.  
 
As a final step, in-depth case study interviews were held with planning officers from 14 local 
authorities.  Case study selection was intended to provide a reasonable spread of local authority 
types and locations. 
 
4.  Research findings 
 
Affordable housing policies 
 
The vast majority (87%) of local authorities in England have a policy that requires the provision 
of affordable housing via planning obligations – a finding that corroborates that of Whitehead 
op cit. However, certain types of authorities are less likely than others to have such a policy, in 
particular, rural towns and old industrial centres. Most authorities do not require affordable 
housing to be provided on small sites, 86% of local authorities specify a threshold number of 
dwellings below which planning obligations in respect of affordable housing are not required.  
The majority set this minimum threshold somewhere between five and fifteen dwellings. For 
developments where affordable housing was required, there is a wide variation in the 
proportion of the total number of dwellings planned for the site that are required to be 
affordable. The proportion was calculated either by number of dwellings or by dwelling floor 
area and ranged from 15% to 50%, with the higher proportions found in the more affluent parts 
of the country, predominantly London and the south east of England.  
 
Just over half (57%) of local authorities have a uniform affordable housing policy that is used 
across the whole of their jurisdiction. 30% of authorities have a target for affordable housing 
provision that varies according to certain criteria. The types of criteria identified are: number of 
dwellings in a scheme; population size of the settlement in which the development is planned; 
whether the site is classified as brownfield or greenfield; or designated in some other way 
including on the basis of ‘Housing Market Areas’ or parishes, between rural/urban and 
sustainable urban extension sites or some other distinction between main urban areas and 
elsewhere. The average length of time that it takes to agree a S106 is six months. 
 
Agreed vs completed affordable dwellings 
 
Table 3 summarises the main findings of four investigations of the number and value of 
planning obligations agreed by local authorities in England (Crook et al, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 
DCLG, 2014). It is important to note that, even if S106 planning obligations are agreed, the 
development may still not go ahead, particularly if the housing market declines (Monk et al, 
2006) and it can be seen that the number of completions (in table 2 above) are far lower that 
those that were agreed. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
The impact of CIL on affordable housing 
 
One of the key differences between CIL and planning obligations is that CIL is a fixed levy and 
S106 planning obligations are negotiable. This has led to concerns that, where scheme viability 
is an issue, there will be a reduction in planning obligations sought and, notably, a reduction in 
affordable housing that is provided. However, the survey of local authority adopters showed 
that only three authorities felt that the introduction of CIL had affected the delivery of 
affordable housing, with one stating “CIL was delivered alongside a review of the Local Plan 
including the affordable housing targets. In a number of locations the proportion of affordable 
housing sought reduced in order to achieve the necessary infrastructure investment” and another 
that “…on a few marginal schemes a reduction in affordable housing provision has been accepted 
when accompanied by an appropriate viability assessment, however this was the same under the 
S106 regime.” On the other hand, 33 authorities felt that CIL had not had an impact on the 
delivery of affordable housing, with others stating that it was too soon to tell. 
 
The issue of the potential impact of CIL on affordable housing development was discussed with 
14 case study authorities.  Of these, only two commented that the introduction of CIL had had a 
direct impact on the delivery of affordable housing.  In one case, this had affected the tenure mix 
of the affordable housing achieved (although the overall percentage had held up) and the other 
authority had been achieving a lower percentage post CIL.  Half of the case studies said that 
there had been no change (or only a minor decrease) and the others either did not know or felt 
that it was too early to tell.  In one case, a downturn in delivery of affordable housing was 
attributed to the then national site size threshold for affordable housing of 10 dwellings. As 
context for their assessment, it was highlighted that there are, “Difficulties with or without CIL, it 
is resisted regardless.” Changing market conditions were also commented on by some 
interviewees with two mentioning that ‘improving market conditions’ had overcome any impact 
that CIL might have on viability.  Another interviewee commented that affordable housing 
delivery had been declining prior to the introduction of CIL and its continuing decline post CIL 
was part of this wider trend. Attention was drawn by at least two interviewees to comments 
from developers before its introduction that CIL would have an adverse impact on scheme 
viability but that they had proceeded to bring forward their schemes with CIL in place: “…have 
got a current application where a developer said they couldn't afford CIL pre adoption but have 
now gone all the way through the process and paid the CIL...” 
 
Although it is too early to assess the impact of CIL on development activity and viability, there 
may be a greater tendency to renegotiate existing s106 agreements in light of introduction of 
CIL and revised s106. The relationship between CIL and affordable housing policy has 
important implications for scheme viability and early evidence from authority studies suggests 
that this can be a complex relationship bringing into play the impact of different affordable 
housing tenure options as well. There then remains the way in which CIL operates in relation to 
remaining s106 requirements to deal with measures for site-specific mitigation. Possible issues 
include: CIL is a first charge so S106 more marginal and therefore harder to negotiate, and the 
cumulative impact of CIL, S106 and new building regulations. 
 
Affordable housing negotiations 
 
The surveys revealed that negotiations remain a concern for some authorities: “The council has 
scaled back its planning obligation requirements since adoption of CIL. However, affordable 
housing was already the most difficult S106 item to negotiate, and this remains the case” and “Site-
specific needs have not changed; in addition the question of viability of affordable housing is now 
raised more frequently.” 
 
The Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 inserted new clauses into S106 of the 1990 Town and 
Country Planning Act that introduces a new application and appeal procedure for the review of 
planning obligations on planning permissions which relate to the provision of affordable 
housing. The changes require a council to assess the viability arguments, to renegotiate 
previously agreed affordable housing levels in a S106, and change the affordable housing 
requirement or face an appeal. An appeal can be made if the authority does not modify the 
planning obligation as requested, or fails to make a determination within a specified time.  
 
In order to assess the extent to which local authorities were being flexible on S106 agreements 
in response to changing market conditions, respondents to the 2013 survey were asked about 
the numbers of S106 agreements being renegotiated.  36% of local authorities had renegotiated 
S106 planning agreements during the 2011-12 financial year, including reductions in the 
amount of affordable housing provision and in the amount of commuted sum payments in lieu 
of affordable housing.  In one case the affordable housing requirement was removed altogether. 
There were also changes to affordable housing tenure (e.g. from social rented to affordable 
rent), a switch from affordable housing provision to commuted payment, a change the timing of 
the provision of affordable housing and a change of clause relating to status of purchasers of 
affordable housing. Nearly all requests to renegotiate s106 agreements in 2011/12 led to a 
change in the planning agreement. 
Local authorities were also asked, as at 1 April 2012, how many s106 agreements were in the 
process of being renegotiated.  A breakdown of the results by local authority family is shown in 
Table 4.  Over two thirds of renegotiations were taking place in rural areas.  There were 
relatively low numbers of renegotiations taking place in London. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
5. Discussion 
 
There is an absence of clear and consistent affordable housing policy at national level. There is 
guidance but no standardised approach. Policies for what is essentially a betterment levy are set 
locally and negotiated individually. As a result there is an emergence of calculative practices. 
These have been discussed by Christophers (2014) and McAllister et al (2015) but they have 
manifested to a greater extent in the case of affordable housing than for other types of planning 
obligation. This is because an affordable housing contribution is widely regarded by the 
development industry as satisfying a social or community need rather than mitigating the 
impact of a development or providing infrastructure that might legitimately be regarded as 
directly required by the development.  
 
The focus for these calculative practices is viability. Development viability appraisals are 
required to be undertaken by local authorities at various junctures in the planning process. As 
far as affordable housing in concerned, viability appraisals are required when setting affordable 
housing targets as part of the local plan process. Developers are able to contest these targets in 
relation to specific planning applications and, as seen from the provisions of the Growth and 
Infrastructure Act referred to above, such contests are encouraged for extant planning consents 
that include residential development and affordable housing provision. 
 
It is worth noting that inconsistency in both policy and practice leads to uncertainty and, in a 
market for what are essentially real options, in which landowners have an option to develop 
their land and are able to limit downside risk by choosing to delay exercise of the option, this 
uncertainty increases the value of these options. The rationale is captured by Whitehead 
(2007); landowners may not bring forward land for development because they anticipate being 
able to use the land more profitably in the future (perhaps as a result of policy change). 
 
Nearly a decade ago Whitehead stated that “…while using the land-use planning system to 
support the provision of affordable housing may be one valuable tool in a government’s armoury, 
the land-use planning system alone is very unlikely to be a primary source of additional affordable 
housing. The English planning system is certainly among the most favourable to such an approach 
and S106 is increasingly successful in its own terms. However, even in England, large-scale 
government financial support is also necessary if affordable housing provision targets are to be 
achieved” (Whitehead, 2007: 41). Since that time CIL has been introduced and central 
government policy has shifted away from the provision of social rented housing. The impact on 
the supply of affordable housing has been negative.  
 
Crook and Monk (2011) offer a more optimistic note: “This approach to taxing development 
value has almost certainly raised far more than each of the three previous attempts to tax 
betterment through nationally determined and levied taxes. This is for two reasons. First, the 
discretionary and negotiating character of planning gain enables LPAs [local planning 
authorities] to structure their policies and negotiations so that ‘tax’ is collected whilst sites remain 
viable and get developed. Second, the rapid increase in house prices and development value has 
been key to the success of negotiations and hence the collection of the ‘tax’” (p1008). Perhaps, 
though, this degree of optimism is misplaced as central government shifts policy away from 
affordable housing supply via the planning system and towards a more direct provision of 
discounted market homes from house builders. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
To conclude, three points can be made. First, only a proportion, perhaps somewhere between 
25% and 50% of land value uplift is being captured for planning obligations. Because affordable 
housing planning obligations are contained within S106 planning agreements there is no 
guarantee that the dwellings will be delivered. Even when negotiations are complete and a 
legally binding S106 agreement is in place, the affordable housing may not necessarily be 
delivered. There is no guarantee of supply and it is greatly affected by market activity. It is also 
worth noting that the system in operation in England is not really a betterment levy at all, it is 
limited to land that is being brought forward for development and therefore does not capture 
any land value uplift received by land that is not being (re)developed. 
 
Second, recent Government policy has encouraged landowners with extant planning 
agreements to contest the amount of affordable housing that had been agreed. This is part of a 
wider shift in Conservative-led Government philosophy that is keen to promote home 
ownership rather than renting. The result is that, although the numbers of affordable housing 
are increasing, it hides a shift from social housing for those in very low incomes to discount 
market housing to first time buyers and key workers. But it is not only at central government 
level that this policy emphasis can be observed. Locally elected councillors set affordable 
housing targets and it may not be a policy priority to provide affordable housing in the locality. 
Also, because of the constraint imposed by viability testing there may be a trade-off between 
provision of affordable housing via S106 and the capture of infrastructure revenue via CIL. The 
balance between these two competing claims on land value uplift is a local policy decision. This 
leads to the third point is that the amount of affordable housing delivered through planning 
obligations is in danger of being eroded by the introduction of CIL as this is a fixed charge on 
land value uplift while planning obligations are negotiable. 
 
Finally, there has been a dearth of policy guidance in relation to the delivery of affordable 
housing via land value capture. This may, at least in part, be due to reluctance by government to 
admit explicitly that that is what it is, given the failure of previous attempts to tax land value 
uplifts upon grant of planning permission. The use of planning obligations to deliver affordable 
housing has evolved from the local level, latterly encouraged by the Labour Government of the 
mid-1990s to 2010 and then tolerated by the Conservative-led coalition Government. However, 
this tolerance has its limits and the gradual shift to discount market housing for owner-
occupation has substantially changed the nature of affordable housing since its introduction in 
the early 1990s. Notwithstanding the change in tenure, there is no doubt that, with negotiated 
quotas of affordable housing being driven by arguments over viability, local authorities are in a 
weak position in terms of access to information, expertise and resources compared to their 
landowner and developer counterparts. This is an area in urgent need of reform. 
 
An important first step is to improve data on land prices. Without a proper understanding of the 
nature of the land value uplift it is difficult for local authorities to negotiate delivery of 
affordable housing that captures a satisfactory proportion of that uplift.  How much should be 
captured?  How does the capture of land value uplift for affordable housing trade off against 
capture for infrastructure provision?  At the moment local authorities are working in an 
information vacuum.  This is why local authorities favour existing use value as a basis for 
determining landowner return – they have no access to market information on what returns or 
prices landowners are achieving. 
 
This is a situation that is exacerbated by the heterogeneity of sites and site values. There are 
substantial differences in land value uplift between high value urban areas (particularly 
London) and lower value rural areas.  Essentially, land value in urban areas is a much higher 
proportion of the total costs of any new development scheme.  This means that land value 
capture should be higher but it also means that disputes and appeals are more commonplace 
because the stakes are higher.  In rural areas, where land value is a smaller proportion of overall 
costs, small changes to the other development inputs such as sale prices and build costs can 
easily turn a viable scheme into an unviable one.  This effect is often hidden because rural land 
sales tend to involve larger sites and therefore large sums of money to the landowner. 
 
Finally, improved access to and availability of land transaction data should mean that it 
becomes a more transparent exercise for local authorities to set out their spending priorities for 
land value capture in terms of infrastructure provision, social rented housing, affordable rented 
housing and discount market housing.  This transparency is key to reducing the level of public 
disquiet and that surrounds the often-opaque negotiations over the capture of land value uplift 
for these purposes.  
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Table 1: New-build affordable dwelling completions by type of scheme, England 
 Social Rent Affordable 
Rent 
Intermediate 
Rent 
Shared 
Ownership 
Affordable 
Home 
Ownership 
Total 
1991-92 21,770 .. .. .. 1,190 22,960 
1992-93 39,510 .. .. .. 1,490 41,000 
1993-94 40,270 .. .. .. 2,460 42,730 
1994-95 40,720 .. .. .. 5,450 46,170 
1995-96 44,220 .. .. .. 5,750 49,970 
1996-97 29,600 .. .. .. 4,010 33,610 
1997-98 24,020 .. .. .. 4,200 28,210 
1998-99 22,620 .. .. .. 3,930 26,550 
1999-00 19,610 .. .. .. 2,750 22,360 
2000-01 18,230 .. .. .. 2,710 20,940 
2001-02 18,640 .. .. .. 3,100 21,740 
2002-03 17,510 .. .. .. 3,590 21,100 
2003-04 18,370 .. 260 .. 5,260 23,890 
2004-05 18,790 .. 680 .. 7,460 26,930 
2005-06 20,510 .. 1,370 .. 11,380 33,260 
2006-07 21,440 .. 1,110 .. 13,680 36,220 
2007-08 25,660 .. 1,050 .. 17,460 44,180 
2008-09 27,600 .. 1,690 .. 14,940 44,220 
2009-10 30,400 .. 1,910 .. 15,750 48,060 
2010-11 35,180 .. 2,390 .. 15,570 53,140 
2011-12 34,920 770 1,700 .. 15,460 52,840 
2012-13 16,870 6,050 820 .. 15,760 39,510 
2013-14 10,220 15,840 690 .. 9,890 36,640 
2014-15 8,450 35,420 250 .. 14,460 58,500 
2015-16 5,820 14,390 1,320 4,020 3,100 28,650 
 Source: DCLG Live Table 1009 
 
  
Table 2: New build affordable dwellings funded by S106 contributions by type of scheme, England 
 Social 
Rent 
Affordable 
Rent 
Affordable and 
Low Cost Home 
Ownership 
Shared 
Ownership 
Total 
2000-01 750 .. 450 .. 1,200 
2001-02 1,070 .. 1,060 .. 2,130 
2002-03 720 .. 1,250 .. 1,970 
2003-04 1,580 .. 1,550 .. 3,130 
2004-05 1,530 .. 1,900 .. 3,430 
2005-06 2,550 .. 3,810 .. 6,360 
2006-07 2,750 .. 4,440 .. 7,190 
2007-08 3,450 .. 4,910 .. 8,360 
2008-09 3,430 .. 3,440 .. 6,870 
2009-10 2,140 .. 1,590 .. 3,730 
2010-11 2,169 .. 1,714 .. 3,883 
2011-12 2,325 41 1,722 .. 4,088 
2012-13 2,217 391 1,834 .. 4,442 
2013-14 3,333 3,698 4,541 .. 11,572 
2014-15 3,024 5,178 6,172 .. 14,374 
2015-16 3,021 3,529 2,829 1,828 11,207 
Source: The old version of DCLG Live Table 1000 (from 2015 this table no longer breaks down affordable 
dwellings by funding source) and DCLG Live Table 1011. 
 
 
Table 3: 2013 survey responses 
Local authority family Number of responses 
(and % of total 
responses) 
Number of all local 
authorities (and % of 
total) 
Rural England  39 (31%) 103 (32%) 
Rural Towns  22 (17%) 57 (17%) 
Urban England  17 (13%) 71 (22%) 
Prosperous Britain  26 (21%) 40 (12%) 
Existing Urban Centres  14 (11%) 29 (9%) 
London  8 (6%) 26 (8%) 
ENGLAND  126 (100%) 326 (100%) 
 
 
Table 4: Local authority ‘families’ 
Family Population % Sample % 
Rural England (RE)  103 32% 39 31% 
Rural Towns (RT)  57 17% 22 17% 
Urban England (UE)  71 22% 17 13% 
Prosperous Britain (PB)  40 12% 26 21% 
Existing Urban Centres (EUC)  29 9% 14 11% 
London  26 8% 8 6% 
TOTAL  326 100% 126 100% 
 
  
 
Table 5: CIL adopters and matched sample of non-adopters 
 Local authority family  
EUC L CB RE RT UE Total 
C
IL
 a
d
o
p
te
rs
 
Median 
house 
price 
band 
1 (£75,000 < £125,000) 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
2 (£125,000 < £175,000) 2 0 0 3 4 4 13 
3 (£175,000 < £225,000) 0 1 3 7 3 2 16 
4 (£225,000 < £275,000) 0 3 8 2 0 0 13 
5 (£275,000 < £325,000) 0 4 8 0 0 1 13 
6 (£325,000 +) 0 6 2 0 0 0 8 
Total 2 14 21 12 8 8 65 
C
IL
 n
o
n
-a
d
o
p
te
rs
 Median 
house 
price 
band 
1 (£75,000 < £125,000) 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
2 (£125,000 < £175,000) 2 1 0 3 4 5 15 
3 (£175,000 < £225,000) 0 1 3 7 3 1 15 
4 (£225,000 < £275,000) 0 3 9 2 0 0 14 
5 (£275,000 < £325,000) 0 1 8 0 0 0 9 
6 (£325,000 +) 0 2 6 1 0 0 9 
Total 2 8 26 13 8 8 65 
 
 
Table 6: Planning obligations agreed 
Year of survey: 
Financial year to which each survey relates: 
2006 
(2003/04) 
2008 
(2005/06) 
2010 
(2007/08) 
2014 
(2011/12) 
Average number of planning agreements per 
local authority 
25 25 30 20 
Number of affordable homes 31,500 44,400 48,000 32,000 
Estimated value of affordable housing 
obligations 
£1.2bn £2bn £2.6bn £2.3bn 
Estimated value of planning obligations, 
excluding affordable housing 
£0.7bn £2bn £2.2bn £1.4bn 
Estimated total value of planning obligations  £1.9bn £4.0bn £4.8bn £3.7bn 
Note: values are nominal figures 
(Source: Crook et al, 2006, 2008, 2010 and DCLG, 2014) 
 
 
Table 7: Number of s106 planning agreements that were in the process  
of being renegotiated on 1 April 2012 
Local authority group Total 
Rural England 70 
Rural Towns 38 
Urban England 10 
Commuter Belt 20 
Existing Urban Centres 18 
London 8 
ENGLAND 164 
 
